

[ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 17, 2014]

No. 14-5018

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT**

JACQUELINE HALBIG, ET AL.,

Appellants,

SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (NO. 13-623 (PLF))

**BRIEF *AMICI CURIAE* FOR ECONOMIC SCHOLARS
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES ON *EN BANC* REVIEW**

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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), the Economic Scholars certify that:

(A) Parties and *Amici*

In addition to the parties and *amici* listed in the Appellees' Opening Brief, the Economic Scholars submitting this brief may have an interest in the outcome of this case. That group consists of the following 49 individuals:

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- **Justin Wolfers, Ph.D.**, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Professor of Economics and Professor of Public Policy, University of Michigan (currently on leave); and

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(B) Rulings Under Review

References to the rulings at issue appear in the Appellees' En Banc Brief.

(C) Related Cases

References to the related cases appear in the Appellees' En Banc Brief.

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**STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE
AND SEPARATE BRIEFING**

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.* The Economic Scholars filed notice of their intent to participate as *amici curiae* on October 29, 2014.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 29(d), *amici curiae* certify that a separate brief is necessary because no other *amicus* brief of which we are aware will address the issue raised in this brief: namely, whether Congress intended the negative economic consequences that would flow from Appellants' proffered interpretation of the statute. To our knowledge, *amici* are the only group of economic scholars submitting a brief in support of Appellees. In light of *amici*'s activities, discussed more fully herein, *amici* are particularly well-suited to discuss the economic underpinnings of the Affordable Care Act as evidenced by the statute's text, structure, and purpose, as well as the economic consequences of Appellants' position.

* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c), *amici curiae* state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than *amici curiae* or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page(s)
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES	i
STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE AND SEPARATE BRIEFING	viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	xi
GLOSSARY	xvii
INTEREST OF <i>AMICI CURIAE</i>	1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	3
ARGUMENT	8
I. The Framework Adopted by Congress Is Premised On Three Necessary And Interrelated Reforms, Which Include Premium Subsidies On All Exchanges.....	8
A. The ACA Rests On Three Interrelated Reforms.....	8
1. <i>Non-discrimination</i>	8
2. <i>Individual Mandate</i>	9
3. <i>Premium Subsidies</i>	11
B. The Only Reasonable Interpretation of The ACA’s Provisions, Structure, and Purpose Is That Congress Intended To Make Subsidies Available To Participants On The Federally-Run Exchange.	13
II. Economic Analysis Confirms What Congress Understood: The ACA Cannot Function Without Premium Subsidies.	17
A. Economic Modeling Shows That, Absent Premium Subsidies, Health Insurance Will Be Unaffordable.....	18
B. State-Based Reform Efforts Confirm That Premium Subsidies Are Essential To Properly Functioning Exchanges.	21

III. Appellants Offer No Plausible Explanation For Why Congress Would
Have Established A Backup Federal Exchange Doomed To Failure.....24

CONCLUSION31

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES*

CASES

Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. United States Department of Energy, 706 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013).....7

**National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius*, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).....8, 9, 10, 11

STATUTES

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26 U.S.C. § 5000A.....10

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GLOSSARY

- ACA: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 23, 2010
- CBO: Congressional Budget Office
- GMSIM: Gruber Microsimulation Model
- USVI: U.S. Virgin Islands

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are a group of 49 distinguished professors and internationally recognized scholars of economics who have taught and researched the economic forces operating in the health care and health insurance markets. The Economic Scholars include economists who have served in high-ranking positions in the Johnson, Ford, Carter, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations; two Nobel Laureates in Economics; two recipients of the John Bates Clark medal, which is awarded biennially to the American economist under 40 who has made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge; one of only two social scientists awarded the Alan T. Waterman Award, usually reserved for physical and chemical scientists; six recipients of the Arrow award for best paper in health economics; and two recipients of the American Society of Health Economists Medal for the best American health economist aged 40 and under. A complete list of the Economic Scholars is provided in the Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases at the front of this brief.

Amici believe that reform of the health care system is essential to constraining the growth of health care spending and to extending health insurance coverage, and that such reforms cannot succeed without premium subsidies for people with low or moderate incomes.

Amici submit this brief to explain the economic reasons why premium subsidies are essential to achieving the reforms of the health care system that Congress seeks through the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), and to urge that the ACA cannot conceivably achieve those reforms if it is interpreted in the manner proposed by the Appellants. Congress – correctly – structured the ACA as a series of interlocking reforms, of which premium subsidies are essential components. If those subsidies are unavailable to the many who will buy insurance on the federal Exchange, the other components of the ACA will not work, and the legislation will fail to achieve its goal of expanding coverage. The best available economic modeling demonstrates that, without these subsidies, average premiums would double and an estimated 6.5 million fewer Americans would have health insurance. Moreover, these increased premiums would burden not just those who would otherwise have been eligible for the subsidies, but the remaining enrollees in the nongroup market as well. That is because those with high expected health care costs will be the most likely to buy coverage despite lacking subsidies. This “adverse selection” will make the insurance pool more expensive to insure and result in much higher premiums for everyone. Failure to apply the ACA in its intended manner to avoid these consequences would thwart Congress’s goal of bringing affordable health care to all Americans.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A central aim of the ACA is to “achieve near-universal coverage” by making health insurance available and affordable to as many Americans as possible – a goal that can be achieved only by subsidizing the premiums of low- and middle-income Americans who do not qualify for Medicaid, and who otherwise would be unable to afford health insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D). Currently, approximately 5.5 million Americans use subsidies to purchase health insurance from the health insurance Exchange operated by the federal government, where individuals and families can compare and shop for non-group health insurance.

Appellants do not and cannot deny that expanding coverage was Congress’s goal. Yet, as Appellants admit, their interpretation would make health insurance unaffordable to the vast majority of Americans who currently receive their insurance from the Exchange operated by the federal government. They nevertheless contend that Congress intended to deny subsidies to those individuals – even as Congress recognized the importance of subsidies to expanding coverage.

Appellants’ interpretation of the ACA cannot be squared with the basic economic framework undergirding that statute, which has been analogized to a stool with three legs. All three legs are necessary to foster stable, functioning insurance markets consistent with Congress’s goal of broad, affordable coverage. The first leg is a series of *non-discrimination rules* that prevent insurers from

charging higher premiums or denying coverage to people with pre-existing conditions or other characteristics that raise the likelihood that they will need health care services. The second leg is the *individual mandate*, which requires everyone, sick or healthy, to buy insurance, and avoids a situation in which only the sickest individuals sign up for insurance, and premiums consequently rise to cover these costly customers. *Premium subsidies* comprise the third leg. These ensure that all people subject to the mandate can afford insurance. After all, a mandate to purchase insurance would be a cruel hoax if insurance were so expensive that few could afford to buy it. Indeed, Congress included affordability protection as part of the mandate, exempting those for whom insurance would be too expensive without subsidies.

Appellants' interpretation would chop out the third leg from this three-legged stool in all States where the federal government operates the Exchange, destabilizing the insurance market in those states and frustrating Congress's clearly stated goal of broadening coverage. Without premium subsidies, millions of people will be exempt from the mandate altogether or will choose to pay the tax penalty rather than purchase costly insurance. Yet the sickest people will continue to sign up for insurance and insurers will have to cover them. The resulting higher premiums would threaten an adverse-selection "death spiral": as premiums increase, more and more healthy people will be exempt from the mandate and will

forgo buying insurance, or, if not exempt, will choose to pay the tax penalty. As a result, sick people would form an ever greater portion of the risk pool, causing premiums to rise and enrollment to fall. Such a result would be incompatible with the structure of the ACA's provisions, as well as the wealth of legislative history showing that Congress understood premium subsidies to be an indispensable part of the ACA's reforms.

Economic modeling confirms what Congress understood: without premium subsidies for every eligible person who buys insurance on an Exchange, the ACA cannot achieve its goals. The well-known Gruber Microsimulation Model ("Gruber Model" or "GMSIM") predicts that if subsidies were unavailable to low- and middle-income individuals on the federally-run Exchange, premiums would increase dramatically. For the typical participant currently receiving subsidies, out-of-pocket premiums under the lowest level ("bronze") plan in the federally-run Exchanges would increase from 3 percent to 23 percent of income. Out-of-pocket premiums for the mid-level ("silver") plan would *double* for all in the market, and would increase from 6 percent to 28 percent of income for the average participant currently receiving subsidies.

Because of these premium increases, the Gruber model predicts that the number of Americans who obtain insurance from the Exchange operated by the federal government would drop from a projected 17 million to 5 million in 2017.

The federally-run Exchange likely could not function in the face of those higher premiums and shrunken enrollment. It is absurd to believe that Congress went to the trouble of creating a federal backstop that would be effectively unaffordable at best, and potentially altogether inoperative.

The predictions of the Gruber Model are corroborated by real world experiences. Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey tried to implement insurance reforms barring discrimination without simultaneously ensuring wide participation through subsidies and mandates. In these states, the obligation to cover a large population of mostly sick and previously uninsurable individuals caused insurers' costs to skyrocket. Faced with a costlier and riskier pool, some insurers simply stopped selling insurance in these states. Those who remained raised premiums to levels many could not afford. Congress, aware of these well-publicized experiments, could not have intended a similar outcome for the nation.

Appellants lack a plausible counter-narrative to support their position. According to Appellants, Congress wanted to allow premium subsidies only for individuals who purchased policies in State-implemented Exchanges to motivate States to set up those Exchanges. This construct entirely misunderstands the role of premium tax credits in the ACA reforms. The ability to offer subsidies is not a gratuitous "carrot" dangled in front of States to lure them to set up their own Exchanges or a "stick" to punish States (or, more accurately, their residents) for

failing to do so. Rather, subsidies are a crucial component of the ACA legislative scheme. Without them, an individual mandate would be impossible and premiums would spiral; Congress's goal of broad, affordable coverage could not be achieved.

Appellants ask this Court to believe that Congress adopted a framework for backstop federally-run Exchanges that would doom them to failure from the outset and thereby frustrate the fundamental goals of the ACA. As Judge Edwards explained in his dissent from the panel opinion, under Appellants' view, Congress intended to enact "a poison pill to the insurance markets in the States that did not elect to create their own Exchanges." *Halbig v. Burwell*, 758 F.3d 390, 415-16 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, J., dissenting). That is an unreasonable construction of ACA's "text, structure, purpose, and history." *Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Energy*, 706 F.3d 499, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). *Amici* therefore ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.

ARGUMENT

I. The Framework Adopted by Congress Is Premised On Three Necessary And Interrelated Reforms, Which Include Premium Subsidies On All Exchanges.

A. The ACA Rests On Three Interrelated Reforms.

Congress carefully structured the ACA to expand health insurance coverage while at the same time containing costs.¹ The coverage increases under the ACA depend on three closely related reforms. Each, correctly understood, is necessary and integral to the economic viability of the overall effort. In economic literature and the popular press, the interrelation among the ACA reforms is often described as a “three-legged stool.” See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, *The Impacts of the Affordable Care Act: How Reasonable Are the Projections?* 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17168, 2011), available at <http://economics.mit.edu/files/6829>.

1. *Non-discrimination.* The first reform brings sweeping changes to the insurance markets by prohibiting various forms of discrimination by health insurers. Under the ACA’s “guaranteed issue” requirements, insurers may no longer refuse to sell insurance or charge higher premiums to enrollees based on pre-existing conditions or other personal characteristics, such as health status,

¹ See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (articulating legislative goal of “achiev[ing] near-universal coverage”); *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius* (“*NFIB*”), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2670 (2012) (“[ACA] attempts to achieve near-universal health insurance coverage....”).

medical condition, medical history, or claims experience. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-3, 300gg-4. Taken together, the reforms comprising this first leg of the stool aim to make health insurance available to all Americans, regardless of factors that previously might have excluded or priced out many individuals. *See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius* (“*NFIB*”), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012). These reforms prevent insurers from “cherry-pick[ing] healthy people and ... weed[ing] out those who are not as healthy.” H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. II, at 990 (2010), *reprinted in* 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 474, 512.

2. *Individual Mandate.* Congress recognized, however, that barring discrimination could not, on its own, solve all problems in the health insurance marketplace – and could generate new problems. Absent further reforms, insurers would have faced rising costs driven by a less healthy pool of insured persons. If costs rise and insurers must charge everyone (or, as under the ACA, everyone of a given age) the same premium, they must “significantly increase premiums on everyone.” *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. Increased premiums, in turn, cause some healthier individuals to delay buying coverage, or to not buy coverage at all, a phenomenon known as “adverse selection.” Over time, adverse selection leads to an increasingly sick and costly pool of insured persons – a chain reaction that

economists refer to as a “death spiral.”² See Brief Of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars In Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal On the Minimum Coverage Issue at 16-17, *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 135048 (“NFIB Amici Brief”); see also *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (“[Congress understood that simply prohibiting insurer discrimination] would trigger an adverse-selection death-spiral in the health-insurance market: Insurance premiums would skyrocket, the number of uninsured would increase, and insurance companies would exit the market.” (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part)); see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I), (J).

Therefore, Congress included a second major reform in the ACA: the requirement that every American either purchase health insurance if it is affordable, or pay a penalty. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. This “individual mandate” was designed to ensure near universal participation in health insurance pools, whether as part of employer-sponsored group insurance, or through the purchase of individual insurance on the State and Federal Exchanges authorized by ACA. By bringing millions of new Americans into these pools, the mandate would spread the risks and costs of coverage across the broad spectrum of the population, both healthy and sick. Congress specifically expected the mandate to “primarily affect[]

² See David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, *Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection*, 113 Q. J. of Econ. 433 (1998).

healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need significant health care.” *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2590. By “broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I), Congress sought to “lower health insurance premiums,” *id.*, and “help[] counter the effect of forcing insurance companies to cover others who impose greater costs than their premiums are allowed to reflect,” *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2590.

3. *Premium Subsidies.* The mandate posed a critical question: Would currently uninsured individuals be able to *afford* health insurance, even when *required* by law to do so? If insurance were unaffordable, the mandate would not succeed in broadening the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals. Meanwhile, insurers – due to the dynamics discussed above – would face rapidly escalating costs that would drive up premiums and cause insurers to abandon the Exchanges. “With fewer buyers and even fewer sellers, the exchanges would not operate as Congress intended and may not operate at all.” *NFIB*, 132 S. Ct. at 2674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Recognizing this problem, Congress enacted a third reform in the ACA – a premium subsidy for low- and middle-income individuals who otherwise could not afford health insurance. The ACA implements this subsidy through a tax credit, which is paid in advance directly to an individual’s insurer. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081-18082; 26 U.S.C. § 36B. By subsidizing premiums, Congress ensured

that the vast majority of uninsured individuals would be able to buy health insurance on one of the authorized exchanges without undue financial burden. The CBO has predicted, for example, that 20 million of the 24 million individuals purchasing insurance on the exchanges (both State and Federal) will be availing themselves of tax credits.³ The individual mandate can apply broadly only because the subsidies make insurance affordable to nearly all.

The ACA therefore requires every individual not covered in other specified ways to buy insurance, with only limited exemptions. In particular, the ACA exempts those for whom the cost of that insurance – *after* the premium subsidy – exceeds eight percent of his or her annual household income. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A), (B)(ii). That eight percent figure shows that Congress intended that most individuals would have the means (via subsidies) and therefore the obligation to purchase insurance. As discussed below, the best estimate is that if subsidies were not available, fully 99% of otherwise subsidy-eligible persons in the federally-run Exchanges would be exempt from the mandate, because insurance costs would exceed 8% of their income. Without the push of the individual mandate and the pull of the premium tax credits, a great number of these would

³ See Cong. Budget Office, Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act—CBO’s February 2014 Baseline, at Table 2 (Feb. 2014), *available at* <http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2014-02-ACAtables.pdf>.

simply decide to remain uninsured. Without subsidies, Congress simply could not have achieved its primary purpose of achieving “near-universal coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D).

B. The Only Reasonable Interpretation of The ACA’s Provisions, Structure, and Purpose Is That Congress Intended To Make Subsidies Available To Participants On The Federally-Run Exchange.

All three legs of the stool – guaranteed issue, the individual mandate, and premium subsidies – are necessary to achieve the ACA’s goals. And it is impossible to parse the statute without concluding that Congress understood and intended all three legs to work together. It is absurd to argue that Congress set up a federally-run Exchange while simultaneously denying participants the subsidies necessary to make the Exchange functional. Absent the means or obligation to pay, the rational course for an individual would be to wait to buy insurance until he or she becomes sick or is at high risk of becoming sick. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (finding that, if there were no mandate, “many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care”). Such behavior would flood the exchanges with sick individuals, raise premiums to the point that the “insurance” would effectively be prepayment, and thereby defeat the very purpose of insurance, which is to protect people from financial ruination at the time of illness. The result would be the death spiral described above, in which

continuously increasing premiums discourage healthy people from buying insurance.

Moreover, these effects would *not* be limited to just the Exchanges because the ACA explicitly requires insurers to treat as a single risk pool plans that are offered both inside and outside of an Exchange. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(1).⁴ The result is that as premiums *inside* the Exchanges rise, premiums *outside* the Exchanges will rise as well, making insurance less affordable not just for low- and middle-income individuals who might have qualified for subsidies, but also for the sizable population that has traditionally relied on the nongroup market for insurance – *e.g.*, the self-employed, early retirees, individuals in employment transitions, and individuals employed by small businesses that do not offer insurance coverage. Again, given that Congress tied the fortunes of these groups together, it is implausible to construe the ACA as condemning them to massive premium increases.

The legislative history confirms that Congress understood the importance of the ACA's interrelated reforms. *See, e.g., H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act of*

⁴ *See also* Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, *Adverse Selection Issues and Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Affordable Care Act 2* (2011), available at <http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-OP.pdf> (“[P]lans offered in the Exchange must receive the same pricing if sold outside the Exchange”); Kaiser Family Foundation, *Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors 2* (Jan. 22, 2014).

2010: *Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Rules* (Mar. 20, 2010) (statement of Rep. Andrews) (explaining that ending discrimination based on pre-existing conditions “doesn’t fit together if you don’t take the next step and the next step,” that is, ensuring broad participation in the insurance market, which cannot be accomplished without subsidies); 157 Cong. Rec. S737 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Franken) (describing the ACA as a “[t]hree-legged stool” and noting that, “[i]f you take any leg out, the stool collapses”).⁵

Congress was likewise presented with analysis from regulators and economists – including some of the Economic Scholars joining this brief – explaining how all three legs of the stool were critical in achieving Congress’s goal of widespread, affordable coverage for all Americans. *See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion on Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Hearings Before the S. Fin. Comm.*, 111th Cong. 501-06 (May 5, 2009) (written comments of Sandy Praeger, on behalf of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners) (“As for proposals that could result in severe adverse selection, such as guaranteed issue ...

⁵ *See also, e.g., Continuation of the Open Executive Session to Consider an Original Bill Providing for Health Care Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance*, 111th Cong. 37-38 (Sept. 25, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Kerry) (recommending Congress follow Massachusetts’ approach of mandating coverage while subsidizing premiums, to “make insurance affordable” and “create a bigger pool of people covered”); *id.* at 38 (noting health care reform in Massachusetts included guaranteed issue requirements, an individual mandate, and a “subsidy up to 300 percent of poverty to help people buy in”).

regulators can support these reforms to the extent they are coupled with an effective and enforceable individual purchase mandate and *appropriate income-sensitive subsidies to make coverage affordable.*” (emphasis added)); *Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means*, 111th Cong. 13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Uwe Reinhardt, Prof. of Econ., Princeton Univ.) (noting that “adequate public subsidies” are instrumental to achieving Congress’s purpose of making health insurance available and affordable to all Americans).

Indeed, the notion that subsidies would be available only on the State exchanges was so obviously fatal to the ACA’s goals that Congress never considered it. As the Director of the CBO explained in a letter to Representative Issa, “the possibility that those subsidies would only be available in states that created their own exchanges did not arise during the discussions CBO staff had with a wide range of Congressional staff when the [ACA] legislation was being considered.” Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives at 1 (Dec. 6, 2012). Instead, the “CBO had anticipated, in its analyses, that the credits would be available in every state.”⁶ *Id.* See also Cong.

⁶ See also Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, *Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” As Amended, In Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”* (JCX-18-10), at 14 (March 21,

Budget Office, *An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act* 19 (Nov. 30, 2009) (reprinted at JA 139-140).

In sum, the only sensible construction of the ACA's provisions, structure, and purpose is that the subsidies would be available to all Exchange participants. Concluding otherwise means finding that Congress sought to legislate into existence a massive new social program that it understood would immediately fail. This Court should reject that irrational construction of the statute and instead construe it consistently with the economic logic that the statute rests upon.

II. Economic Analysis Confirms What Congress Understood: The ACA Cannot Function Without Premium Subsidies.

Economic analysis confirms what Congress understood: that the ACA cannot function nationally if subsidies are available only to those who purchase insurance through the State-administered exchanges. That is the lesson of both economic modeling, as well as the natural experiments of jurisdictions that have attempted to reform health care without providing subsidies to increase access.

2010), *available at* <https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673> (stating that “[p]remium assistance credits may be used for any plan purchased through an exchange”); Cong. Budget Office, *An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act*, at 6-7 (Nov. 30, 2009) (estimating that about 57% of nongroup enrollees would receive subsidies “via the new insurance exchanges”).

A. Economic Modeling Shows That, Absent Premium Subsidies, Health Insurance Will Be Unaffordable.

Economist and MIT Professor Jonathan Gruber has developed a sophisticated economic model that allows for a robust prediction of outcomes in the health care system, depending on various policy changes.⁷ The Gruber Microsimulation Model (“GMSIM”) utilizes two primary sets of data: (1) Fixed information on individuals, derived from 2011 Current Population Survey data and updated to 2013 and later years; and (2) varying information on policy parameters,

⁷ Appellants quote a YouTube video that they contend shows Professor Gruber, who is also a signatory to this brief, endorsing Appellants’ reading of the statute. Appellants’ En Banc Br. 4. Professor Gruber has stated that he has never held that view, and indeed, just one month before making these remarks, he served on a Study Panel on Health Insurance Exchanges that issued a report making clear that premium subsidies would be available to those obtaining insurance from the federal Exchange. See Deborah Bachrach & Patricia Boozang, Robert Wood Johnson Found. & Nat’l Acad. of Soc. Ins., *Federally Facilitated Exchanges and the Continuum of State Options*, at i-ii (2011) (listing Professor Gruber as a member of the study panel and stating that “[t]he views expressed in this report are those of the study panel members”), available at <http://www.healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/Federally-Facilitated-Exchanges-and-the-Continuum-of-State-Options.pdf>; *id.* at 11 (“HHS noted that the ACA and proposed regulations are clear that individuals enrolling through a Federally-facilitated Partnership Exchange have access to advanced payments of premium tax credits”). To the extent that the YouTube video suggests otherwise, Professor Gruber has explained they are misstatements. See Jonathan Cohn, *Jonathan Gruber: “It Was Just a Mistake”*, New Republic, July 25, 2014, available at <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118851/jonathan-gruber-halbig-says-quote-exchanges-was-mistake>.

which inform the changes in price and eligibility of various forms of insurance.⁸ The GMSIM has been cited as one of the leading options for modeling health insurance reforms such as the ACA.⁹

The GMSIM demonstrates that the health care reforms effectuated by the ACA will not be economically viable without premium subsidies for insurance policies purchased on all exchanges. For the typical participant currently eligible for subsidies, coverage under the lowest level (“bronze”) plan in the federally-run exchanges would require out-of-pocket premium payments equal to 23 percent of income. Premiums for the mid-level (“silver”) plan would *double* for all market participants, subsidized or not, and would require the typical participant currently eligible for subsidies to pay, out of pocket, premiums equal to 28 percent of income.

Considering that Congress chose not to impose the individual mandate on any individual for whom the cost of insurance was more than 8 percent of their income, *see supra*, it is clear that Congress would have viewed these premiums as

⁸ See MIT Economics, Jonathan Gruber, Documentation for the Gruber Microsimulation Model at 2-3, *available at* <http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/gruberj/lightread>.

⁹ See, e.g., Dahlia Remler et al., *Modeling Health Insurance Expansions: Effect of Alternate Approaches*, 23 J. of Policy Analysis & Mgmt. 291 (2004); Jean M. Abraham, State Health Reform Assistance Network, *Predicting the Effects of the Affordable Care Act: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Microsimulation Models 5* (Mar. 2012), *available at* http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/publications/Brief_Microsimulation_Mar2012_0.pdf.

unaffordable. Indeed, absent subsidies, the GMSIM predicts that health insurance coverage would be unaffordable for more than 99 percent of the families and individuals currently eligible to receive those subsidies. Moreover, the GMSIM predicts that, if subsidies were unavailable in states with a federally-run Exchange, the number of people receiving health insurance from the federally-run Exchange by 2017 would fall from 17 million to only 5 million.¹⁰ And, as explained above,

¹⁰ It should also go without saying that the costs to society as a whole will be enormous. Millions of Americans who would have received necessary medical care will now be denied that care. *See, e.g.*, Nat'l Research Council, *Care Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late* (2002); Stan Dorn, Urban Institute, *Uninsured and Dying Because of it: Updating the Institute of Medicine Analysis on the Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality* (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411588_uninsured_dying.pdf; Angela Fowler-Brown, et al., *Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Death – Does Insurance Matter?*, 22 J. Gen. Internal Med. 502 (2007). Millions of Americans, moreover, who were to be protected from the dire financial consequences of being uninsured will now be subjected to increased bankruptcy risk and the enormous negative mental health implications of that stress. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(G) (finding that “62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses,” and that the provisions of the ACA “will improve financial security for families”); *see also* Katherine Baicker et al., *The Oregon Experiment – Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes*, 368 New Eng. J. Med. 1713 (2013), available at <http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMSa1212321>. And hospitals who were to see a substantial reduction in the costs of their uncompensated care will now see those costs remain high, at the same time that the ACA is cutting back on their federal subsidies to support such care. *Cf.* John Holahan et al., The Urban Institute, *The Cost of Not Expanding Medicaid* 11-13 (July 2013), available at <http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8457-the-cost-of-not-expanding-medicaid4.pdf>. Finally, the coverage and access-to-care disparities that would be triggered by eliminating subsidies in states with a federally-run Exchange would be further exacerbated by the decision in many of those same states to decline federal support for Medicaid expansion. *Id.* at 17.

there would be spillover effects to the non-group market more generally because the ACA requires insurers to treat all non-group enrollees the same, regardless if they purchase insurance on the federally-run Exchanges. *See supra*. It is quite likely that overall prices in the individual insurance market, inside and outside of exchanges, would end up higher than they are today. Indeed, the GMSIM predicts that, if Appellants' position were accepted, the estimated number of Americans without health insurance coverage would *increase* by 7 million, relative to the ACA as designed.¹¹

B. State-Based Reform Efforts Confirm That Premium Subsidies Are Essential To Properly Functioning Exchanges.

The concept of the three-legged stool and the results of the GMSIM modeling are corroborated further by evidence from state-based experiments with health insurance reform, which were well-known to Congress. These jurisdictions provide evidence that health care reform is entirely impracticable without premium subsidies.

¹¹ Another recent paper by RAND Corporation researchers, employing a different microsimulation model, confirmed that “[i]f the ACA’s subsidies are eliminated entirely, our model predicts a near death spiral – that is, sharp premium increases and drastic enrollment declines in the individual market.” *See* Christine Eibner & Evan Saltzman, Rand Corp., *Assessing Alternative Modifications to the Affordable Care Act 25* (2014), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR708.html.

Massachusetts. The tumultuous experience in Massachusetts documents why all three legs are necessary to make broad coverage affordable and stable. The state first tried to reform the health insurance market in 1996. The legislature passed guaranteed issue and community rating laws that prohibited insurers from discriminating in the issuance of insurance on the basis of health status or other factors, prohibited insurers from varying premium rates based on health status, and restricted the amount by which insurers might vary rates based on characteristics such as age or sex. Following these reforms, average premiums for individual coverage reached \$8,537 per year, the most expensive in the nation by a wide margin.¹² Those premiums fell only after Massachusetts implemented a second wave of reforms that included *both* an individual mandate *and* premium subsidies for low-income individuals. With the combination of those reforms, premiums for individual coverage in Massachusetts dropped by 35% compared to the national average between 2006 and 2009.¹³

New York. In 1993, in what was “[w]idely regarded as the most far reaching package of [health insurance] reforms” of the time, New York implemented

¹² See America’s Health Insurance Plans, *Individual Health Insurance 2006-2007: A Comprehensive Survey of Premiums, Availability, and Benefits*, at 8 (Dec. 2007), available at <http://www.ahip.org/Individual-Market-Survey-2007/>.

¹³ See John A. Graves & Jonathan Gruber, *How Did Health Care Reform in Massachusetts Impact Insurance Premiums?*, 102 *Am. Econ. Rev.* 508, 511 (2012).

guaranteed issue and community rating reforms, but not a mandate or subsidies.¹⁴ In the years following these reforms, premiums rose substantially in the non-group insurance market, with some insurers increasing premium rates by as much as 40% by early 2000.¹⁵ Individuals who obtained insurance through the non-group market were older, experienced a greater incidence of high-cost health conditions, had higher hospital utilization, and were generally costlier to cover than individuals insured through group policies.¹⁶ Despite subsequent remedial reform efforts by the legislature, premiums continued to skyrocket, and individual market enrollment continued to plummet.¹⁷ This situation began to change only after the ACA's exchange-based subsidies and individual mandate came into effect for the 2014 plan year. Indeed, premiums set by insurers for 2014 ACA-compliant plans in the non-group insurance market have dropped dramatically relative to the pre-ACA levels.¹⁸

¹⁴ See Leigh Wachenheim & Hans Leida, *The Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Reforms on States' Individual Insurance Markets*, at 37 (Mar. 2012) (“*Impact of Guaranteed Issue*”), available at <http://www.ahip.org/Issues/Documents/2012/The-Impact-of-Guaranteed-Issue-and-Community-Rating-Reforms-on-Individual-Insurance-Markets.aspx>.

¹⁵ Mark A. Hall, *An Evaluation of New York's Reform Law*, 25 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & Law 71 (2000).

¹⁶ *Id.*; *Impact of Guaranteed Issue*, at 38.

¹⁷ *Impact of Guaranteed Issue*, at 39.

¹⁸ See Freeman Klopott & Alex Nussbaum, *New York Health Exchanges Offer 50% Drop In Premiums*, Bloomberg (July 17, 2013, 11:29 AM), available at

New Jersey. The experience of New Jersey, which enacted guaranteed issue and community rating reforms in 1992, shows evidence of the “adverse selection death spiral” of which economists warn.¹⁹ As the reforms took hold in the market, premiums increased dramatically; one carrier raised premiums by 415% over a two-year period. Additionally, the number of carriers in the market shrank from a high of 29 in 1995 to only 6 in 2012, and the proportion of residents with insurance fell.²⁰ Ultimately, New Jersey’s reform experiment failed even to maintain the pre-reform rate of insurance in the state.²¹

III. Appellants Offer No Plausible Explanation For Why Congress Would Have Established A Backup Federal Exchange Doomed To Failure.

A. Appellants’ “Poison Pill” Theory Is Without Support.

It is telling that Appellants do not offer any counter-model to explain plausibly how affordability reform of the American health care system could stand without one of the three “legs” described above. Instead, Appellants posit that Congress purposely dangled the carrot of affordable health insurance for low-income families and individuals in front of states to encourage states to establish exchanges. In Appellants’ conception, the stick of having to explain to their voters

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-17/new-york-insurance-rates-said-to-drop-about-50-for-individuals.html>.

¹⁹ *Impact of Guaranteed Issue*, at 31.

²⁰ *Id.* at 30.

²¹ *Id.* at 33.

that they had deprived them of billions of dollars by failing to establish an Exchange would so frighten state officials that eventually, every state would create an Exchange and, consequently, uninsured Americans nationwide would become eligible for premium subsidies. Appellants' En Banc Br. at 32-33. That account – for which Appellants provide no evidentiary support – is implausible and indeed irreconcilable with the ACA's structure and purpose.

According to Appellants' construct, Congress knew that § 1401 of the ACA limited availability of premium subsidies to residents of states that established their own exchanges. As Appellants see it, Congress was willing to exclude from the promise of affordable health insurance any low- or moderate-income family or individual who happened to be unfortunate enough to live in a state that refused to set up its own Exchange. Congress, Appellants assert, intentionally conditioned federal assistance to make health insurance affordable for these families and individuals on each state's willingness to undertake the thankless job of establishing and operating Exchanges. According to Appellants' theory, states will eventually buckle under the pressure of their uninsured citizenry and create their own exchanges.

But the tale told by Appellants is entirely at odds with what Congress knew and intended when it enacted the ACA. First, as explained above, Congress fully understood the economic need for the ACA to rest on the three interlocking

reforms, of which subsidies were one primary component. Nothing in the record suggests that Congress intended the economically disastrous approach of dramatically limiting subsidies only to participants in state exchanges. Second, the Congressional Budget Office never entertained the possibility that subsidies would not be available across all Exchanges. *See supra*. Members of Congress consulted regularly with the CBO, yet not one of them indicated that the CBO's work was at odds with congressional intent. Third, initial versions of the ACA indicate that premium subsidies were understood to be available for enrollees buying insurance on the federal Exchange. Premium tax credits were included in the House bill even though that bill provided for a single Federal exchange rather than state exchanges. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. tit. III, § 301 (2009) (establishing single, federal exchange); *id.* tit. III, § 343 (providing for "affordability premium credit"). In the endgame debate in which the House debated Senate language, it is inconceivable that the House would have accepted a change sure to cripple the federally-run Exchange. Appellants point to nothing in the legislative record to support their economically implausible argument that the purpose of the subsidies changed from the initial House proposal to the final Act. Instead, as Judge Edwards put it, Appellants peddle a "narrative concocted to provide a colorable explanation for the otherwise risible notion that Congress

would have wanted insurance markets to collapse in States that elected not to create their own Exchanges.” *Halbig*, 758 F.3d at 416 (Edwards, J., dissenting).

If anything, the record establishes that Congress created the state Exchanges not because it intended the federally-run Exchanges to be dysfunctional, but simply to provide States the option of creating their own exchanges. The federally-run Exchanges remained available to those States that lacked the resources, expertise, or desire to build their own.²²

B. Congress’s Treatment of the Federal Territories Offers No Support to Appellants’ Position.

The panel decision rested heavily on the notion that Appellants’ interpretation of the statute is not absurd because Congress supposedly enacted a one-legged stool in the federal territories. *See Halbig*, 758 F.3d at 410. Yet the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) recognized, in a letter issued six days before the panel decision, that the best reading of the statutory scheme is that Congress did *not* intend to apply health-insurance market reforms – the non-

²² *See, e.g.*, 156 Cong. Rec. H2423-H2424 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“Under the new law, ‘a State is free to establish a health insurance exchange if it so chooses. But if it declines, the Secretary will establish an exchange.’ This is a strong example of what the Supreme Court has recognized as an appropriate exercise of federal power to encourage State participation in important federal programs.”); 156 Cong. Rec. H2207 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2010) (statement of Rep. Burgess) (“[W]hat happens in a State that doesn’t set up an exchange? [T]he [federal government] ... is going to ... [set] up ... a national exchange that every State that doesn’t have a State-based exchange, that their citizens can buy through this national exchange.”)

discrimination leg of the stool – in the territories.²³ Thus, the panel’s premise is simply incorrect.

HHS was prompted to revisit its legal analysis by the real-world experience of the U.S. Virgin Islands (“USVI”) in implementing the various market reforms without either an individual mandate or subsidies. A report from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, analyzing evidence from the USVI experience, explains that, prior to the market reforms, only one insurer sold individual policies in the USVI; since the enactment of those reforms, that insurer ceased selling new policies, and USVI residents have been entirely unable to purchase nongroup insurance.²⁴ That is, fears of the adverse death spiral dissuaded insurers from offering individual policies, the type of coverage Congress designed the exchanges to provide. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners concluded that “[w]ithout some action to prevent a cycle of adverse selection in the territories” – such as a mandate in conjunction with subsidies – “implementation of the ACA’s market reforms is likely to lead to a result that is the opposite of what

²³See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. to Comm’r Gregory R. Francis, Office of Lieutenant Governor (July 16, 2014) [http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/ Downloads/letter-to-Francis.pdf](http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/letter-to-Francis.pdf).

²⁴ See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Health Ins. & Managed Care Comm., *Implementation of the Affordable Care Act in the U.S. Territories*, at 5 (Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_comments_140501_naic_letter_us_territories_paper_final.pdf.

the ACA intended – higher premiums, less competition, and more Americans without health insurance coverage.”²⁵

C. The CLASS Act Refutes Appellants’ Position.

The panel decision, *see Halbig*, 758 F.3d at 410, also relied upon the notion that Congress purportedly enacted a one-legged stool in the Community Living Assistance Services and Support (“CLASS”) Act, which required the Secretary of HHS to establish a community-based long-term care insurance program. *See* Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 8001-8002, 124 Stat. 119, 828-47 (2010), *repealed*, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 642 (2013). That argument, however, overlooks Congress’s express concern that the CLASS Act program might not be actuarially sound. Congress directed the Secretary of HHS to establish the program *only* if found to be actuarially sound. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-2(a)(1) (2012) (“The Secretary ... shall develop at least 3 *actuarially sound* benefit plans...” (emphasis added)). Congress further directed the board tasked with administering the CLASS Act to certify annually whether the program was actuarially sound. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-5(c)(2)(B)(i)(III) (2012). The Secretary of HHS subsequently reported to

²⁵ *Id.* at 9; *see also id.* at 7-11.

Congress that the CLASS program could not be made actuarially sound.²⁶ Congress then repealed the statute. *See* Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 642 (2013).

If Congress intended to omit a vital third leg from the federal health insurance Exchange program, one would expect that Congress would have demonstrated a similar concern with that marketplace's actuarial soundness. In fact, Congress did instruct the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study of the Exchanges within five years, addressing issues such as physician network adequacy and complaints data. 42 U.S.C. § 18033(b). Tellingly, the GAO was not asked to report on whether the program was actuarially sound. Congress was confident that the three-legged approach (supplemented by the statutory premium stabilization programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061-18063) would ensure the soundness of the Exchanges. Most tellingly, the report request makes no distinction between state-operated and federally-facilitated exchanges. Congress understood that they would both function in identical fashion, with both granting premium tax credits.

* * *

In sum, Appellants' argument cannot be squared with what Congress correctly understood to be the case: that the goals of the ACA could not be

²⁶ *See* Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y Health & Human Res. to Speaker John Boehner, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 14, 2011, *available at* <http://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/boehner-.pdf>.

accomplished without providing subsidies to low and middle income individuals and families, regardless of whether they purchased insurance on a state or federal Exchange. This Court should reject an interpretation of the ACA that cannot be, and is not, what Congress intended.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the *amici* Economic Scholars respectfully urge that the Court affirm the district court's judgment.

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Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), I certify the following:

This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) because it contains 6,994 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2007 in Times New Roman 14-point font.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of November, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit via the Court's CM/ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to all counsel who are registered CM/ECF users.

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